USAID's $43.9M Senegal food security contract awarded to International Resources Group Ltd. shows cost-plus-fixed-fee structure
Contract Overview
Contract Amount: $43,876,291 ($43.9M)
Contractor: International Resources Group Ltd.
Awarding Agency: Agency for International Development
Start Date: 2009-04-16
End Date: 2015-05-31
Contract Duration: 2,236 days
Daily Burn Rate: $19.6K/day
Competition Type: NON-COMPETITIVE DELIVERY ORDER
Number of Offers Received: 1
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE
Sector: Other
Official Description: INCREASE FOOD SECURITY THROUGH A SET OF INTERRELATED ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN THROUGH THE ACCELERATED GROWTH AND INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS IN SENEGAL.
Plain-Language Summary
Agency for International Development obligated $43.9 million to INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP LTD. for work described as: INCREASE FOOD SECURITY THROUGH A SET OF INTERRELATED ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN THROUGH THE ACCELERATED GROWTH AND INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS IN SENEGAL. Key points: 1. The contract utilized a non-competitive delivery order, raising questions about potential cost efficiencies and market-driven pricing. 2. A cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) pricing structure was employed, which can incentivize cost overruns if not closely monitored. 3. The contract duration of 2236 days (over 6 years) suggests a long-term commitment to achieving food security objectives. 4. The award was made by the Agency for International Development (USAID), indicating a focus on international development assistance. 5. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 541990 points to 'All Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services,' a broad category. 6. The absence of small business set-aside flags suggests this contract was not specifically targeted to boost small business participation.
Value Assessment
Rating: fair
Benchmarking the value of this contract is challenging without specific performance metrics or comparable international development contracts. The CPFF structure, while common in complex projects, carries inherent risks of cost escalation. Without detailed breakdowns of costs and the fixed fee, a precise value-for-money assessment is difficult. However, the significant dollar amount suggests a substantial investment in the program's objectives.
Cost Per Unit: N/A
Competition Analysis
Competition Level: unknown
This contract was awarded as a non-competitive delivery order. This implies that a competitive bidding process was not conducted for this specific award. Such awards can occur for various reasons, including follow-on work to existing contracts or in situations where only one source is deemed capable. The lack of competition limits the opportunity for price discovery and potentially higher costs for the government.
Taxpayer Impact: Taxpayers may not have received the benefit of competitive pricing, potentially leading to higher overall expenditure for the services rendered.
Public Impact
The primary beneficiaries are intended to be populations in Senegal facing food insecurity, through improved agricultural practices and market access. The services delivered aim to increase food security and competitiveness within Senegal's agricultural sector. The geographic impact is focused on Senegal, with potential ripple effects on regional food stability. Workforce implications could include local employment opportunities for project implementation and capacity building within Senegalese institutions.
Waste & Efficiency Indicators
Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10
Warning Flags
- Non-competitive award limits price discovery and potential cost savings.
- Cost-plus-fixed-fee structure can incentivize higher spending if not rigorously managed.
- Broad service category (541990) makes specific performance assessment difficult without further detail.
- Long contract duration increases exposure to changing economic conditions and program effectiveness risks.
Positive Signals
- Focus on a critical development issue: food security.
- Long-term commitment suggests a strategic approach to addressing complex challenges.
- Award to a known entity (International Resources Group Ltd.) may indicate prior successful engagement or specialized expertise.
Sector Analysis
This contract falls within the professional, scientific, and technical services sector, specifically related to international development and agricultural programs. The market for such services is global, with numerous organizations specializing in development aid, food security, and technical assistance. USAID's spending in this area is substantial, reflecting the U.S. government's commitment to global development goals. Benchmarking against similar USAID-funded agricultural or food security projects in other countries would provide further context on cost and scope.
Small Business Impact
The contract data indicates that this was not a small business set-aside, nor does it appear to have specific subcontracting requirements for small businesses mentioned. This suggests that the primary contractor, International Resources Group Ltd., was expected to perform the majority of the work. The impact on the small business ecosystem is likely minimal unless the prime contractor actively engages small businesses as subcontractors, which is not explicitly detailed here.
Oversight & Accountability
Oversight for this contract would primarily reside with the Agency for International Development (USAID), likely through its contracting officers and program managers. Accountability measures would be tied to the performance objectives outlined in the contract and the reporting requirements of the CPFF structure. Transparency would depend on USAID's public disclosure policies regarding contract performance and financial reporting. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply to any allegations of fraud, waste, or abuse.
Related Government Programs
- USAID Food Security Programs
- International Development Assistance
- Agricultural Development Projects
- West Africa Development Initiatives
Risk Flags
- Non-competitive award
- Cost-plus-fixed-fee pricing
- Lack of detailed performance metrics in award data
Tags
usaid, international-development, food-security, senegal, non-competitive, cost-plus-fixed-fee, professional-scientific-technical-services, delivery-order, large-contract, foreign-assistance
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this federal contract paying for?
Agency for International Development awarded $43.9 million to INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP LTD.. INCREASE FOOD SECURITY THROUGH A SET OF INTERRELATED ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN THROUGH THE ACCELERATED GROWTH AND INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS IN SENEGAL.
Who is the contractor on this award?
The obligated recipient is INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP LTD..
Which agency awarded this contract?
Awarding agency: Agency for International Development (Agency for International Development).
What is the total obligated amount?
The obligated amount is $43.9 million.
What is the period of performance?
Start: 2009-04-16. End: 2015-05-31.
What specific activities were undertaken to increase food security in Senegal under this contract?
The contract aimed to 'INCREASE FOOD SECURITY THROUGH A SET OF INTERRELATED ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN THROUGH THE ACCELERATED GROWTH AND INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS IN SENEGAL.' While the broad objective is clear, the specific activities are not detailed in the provided data. Typically, such contracts involve agricultural extension services, farmer training, market access improvements, policy reform advocacy, and potentially support for agricultural infrastructure. The 'interrelated activities' suggest a holistic approach, possibly encompassing value chain development, climate-smart agriculture practices, and nutritional education. A deeper dive into USAID's project documentation or contractor reports would be necessary to enumerate the precise interventions.
How does the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) structure compare to other contract types for similar international development projects?
The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) structure is common for complex, research-oriented, or development projects where the scope of work may evolve or is not precisely definable at the outset. Unlike fixed-price contracts, CPFF reimburses the contractor for allowable costs plus a predetermined fixed fee representing profit. This contrasts with Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contracts, which adjust the fee based on performance against targets, or firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts, which offer greater cost certainty but less flexibility. For international development, CPFF can be advantageous when unforeseen challenges arise, allowing for adaptation without constant renegotiation. However, it places a significant burden on the contracting agency to meticulously audit costs and ensure efficiency, as the contractor has less direct financial incentive to minimize expenses compared to FFP.
What is the track record of International Resources Group Ltd. with USAID or similar agencies?
International Resources Group Ltd. (IRG) has a history of working on international development projects, often funded by agencies like USAID. Their portfolio typically includes areas such as agriculture, natural resource management, energy, and economic growth. Information available suggests IRG has been involved in numerous projects globally, contributing to various development objectives. To assess their track record specifically for this Senegal contract, one would need to examine past performance evaluations, project completion reports, and any formal feedback provided by USAID or other clients. A review of their website and public project databases can offer insights into their experience and the types of projects they undertake, but detailed performance metrics for specific contracts are often internal.
What are the potential risks associated with a non-competitive award for a contract of this magnitude?
A non-competitive award, also known as a sole-source or limited-source procurement, carries several potential risks, especially for a contract valued at nearly $44 million. The primary risk is the lack of price competition, which can lead to the government paying a higher price than if multiple bids were solicited. Without the pressure of competing offers, contractors may have less incentive to offer their most competitive rates. Furthermore, a non-competitive process can limit the government's access to innovative solutions or a wider pool of qualified contractors that might emerge from a broader solicitation. It also raises concerns about fairness and transparency in the procurement process, potentially leading to perceptions of favoritism if not adequately justified.
How does the $43.9 million expenditure align with typical USAID spending on food security in West Africa?
Assessing alignment requires comparing this contract's value to USAID's overall budget allocations for food security initiatives in West Africa over the contract's period (2009-2015). USAID's Feed the Future initiative, launched in 2010, significantly increased focus and funding on food security globally, including in West Africa. A $43.9 million contract over six years represents a substantial investment, averaging over $7 million per year. This figure would need to be contextualized against the total USAID budget for the region and the specific country strategies for Senegal during that timeframe. Without access to USAID's historical budget data and program allocations for Senegal, it's difficult to definitively state if this expenditure is high, low, or average relative to other similar programs.
Industry Classification
NAICS: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services › All Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Product/Service Code: SUPPORT SVCS (PROF, ADMIN, MGMT) › PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Competition & Pricing
Extent Competed: NON-COMPETITIVE DELIVERY ORDER
Solicitation Procedures: NEGOTIATED PROPOSAL/QUOTE
Offers Received: 1
Pricing Type: COST PLUS FIXED FEE (U)
Evaluated Preference: NONE
Contractor Details
Parent Company: Engility Corporation (UEI: 783837672)
Address: 1211 CONNECTICUT AVE NW STE 700, WASHINGTON, DC, 20036
Business Categories: Category Business, Not Designated a Small Business
Financial Breakdown
Contract Ceiling: $47,192,452
Exercised Options: $47,192,452
Current Obligation: $43,876,291
Contract Characteristics
Multi-Year Contract: Yes
Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL ITEM PROCEDURES NOT USED
Parent Contract
Parent Award PIID: AID685I000600005
IDV Type: IDC
Timeline
Start Date: 2009-04-16
Current End Date: 2015-05-31
Potential End Date: 2017-01-26 00:00:00
Last Modified: 2017-01-25
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