DoD awards $451M sole-source contract for aircraft parts, raising value-for-money questions

Contract Overview

Contract Amount: $451,206,698 ($451.2M)

Contractor: Textron Systems Corporation

Awarding Agency: Department of Defense

Start Date: 2007-11-01

End Date: 2010-10-31

Contract Duration: 1,095 days

Daily Burn Rate: $412.1K/day

Competition Type: NOT COMPETED

Number of Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE

Sector: Defense

Official Description: PBL CONTRACT

Place of Performance

Location: COCKEYSVILLE, BALTIMORE County, MARYLAND, 21030

State: Maryland Government Spending

Plain-Language Summary

Department of Defense obligated $451.2 million to TEXTRON SYSTEMS CORPORATION for work described as: PBL CONTRACT Key points: 1. Contract awarded on a sole-source basis, limiting price competition and potentially increasing costs. 2. Significant contract value suggests a critical need for these aircraft parts. 3. Long contract duration of 1095 days may indicate a stable, long-term requirement. 4. Cost-plus incentive fee structure allows for shared risk and reward between government and contractor. 5. Lack of competition raises concerns about whether the government secured the best possible price. 6. The contract's focus on 'Other Aircraft Parts' suggests a broad scope within a specialized manufacturing sector.

Value Assessment

Rating: questionable

The contract's total value of over $451 million for aircraft parts, awarded without competition, warrants scrutiny. Without competitive bids, it is difficult to benchmark the pricing against market rates or similar contracts. The cost-plus incentive fee structure, while offering some flexibility, can lead to higher costs if not managed diligently. The government may not have achieved optimal value due to the absence of a competitive bidding process.

Cost Per Unit: N/A

Competition Analysis

Competition Level: sole-source

This contract was awarded on a sole-source basis, meaning only one bidder was solicited. This typically occurs when a unique capability is required, or in situations where competition is not feasible or practical. The lack of multiple bidders means there was no direct price comparison, potentially leading to less favorable pricing for the government.

Taxpayer Impact: Sole-source awards mean taxpayers do not benefit from the cost savings that typically arise from a competitive bidding process. This can result in higher overall expenditure for the government.

Public Impact

The Department of the Army is the primary beneficiary, receiving essential aircraft parts. This contract supports the operational readiness of military aircraft. The contract's impact is likely concentrated within the defense industrial base, supporting specialized manufacturing. Workforce implications may include employment for skilled labor in aircraft parts manufacturing.

Waste & Efficiency Indicators

Waste Risk Score: 50 / 10

Warning Flags

Positive Signals

Sector Analysis

This contract falls within the 'Other Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing' sector, a specialized segment of the broader aerospace and defense industry. This sector is characterized by high technical requirements and often involves complex supply chains. Comparable spending benchmarks are difficult to establish without more specific details on the parts procured, but the scale of this award indicates a significant requirement within the Department of Defense's aviation sustainment efforts.

Small Business Impact

The data indicates this contract was not set aside for small businesses (ss: false, sb: false). As a sole-source award, it is unlikely that subcontracting opportunities for small businesses were a primary consideration in the award process. The impact on the small business ecosystem is therefore likely minimal unless the prime contractor voluntarily engages small businesses in its supply chain.

Oversight & Accountability

The contract is a definitive contract, suggesting a clear scope and terms. Oversight would typically be managed by the contracting officer and program management office within the Department of the Army. Inspector General jurisdiction would apply for investigations into fraud, waste, or abuse. Transparency is limited due to the sole-source nature of the award.

Related Government Programs

Risk Flags

Tags

defense, department-of-defense, department-of-the-army, aircraft-parts, manufacturing, sole-source, definitive-contract, cost-plus-incentive-fee, maryland, large-contract

Frequently Asked Questions

What is this federal contract paying for?

Department of Defense awarded $451.2 million to TEXTRON SYSTEMS CORPORATION. PBL CONTRACT

Who is the contractor on this award?

The obligated recipient is TEXTRON SYSTEMS CORPORATION.

Which agency awarded this contract?

Awarding agency: Department of Defense (Department of the Army).

What is the total obligated amount?

The obligated amount is $451.2 million.

What is the period of performance?

Start: 2007-11-01. End: 2010-10-31.

What specific aircraft parts are being procured under this contract, and why were they deemed only available from Textron Systems Corporation?

The provided data classifies the contract under NAICS code 336413, 'Other Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing.' However, it does not specify the exact parts. The reason for a sole-source award typically stems from unique technical requirements, proprietary technology, or a lack of viable alternative sources. For this contract, the Department of the Army would have had to justify why Textron Systems Corporation was the only capable provider, potentially due to specialized design, manufacturing processes, or existing integration with specific aircraft platforms. Without further documentation, the precise justification remains unclear, but it implies a critical dependency on Textron's offerings for these particular parts.

How does the cost-plus incentive fee (CPIF) structure typically influence contractor behavior and final costs compared to other contract types like fixed-price?

A Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract is designed to share the risks and rewards between the government and the contractor. The government pays the actual allowable costs incurred by the contractor, plus a fee that is adjusted based on performance against pre-determined targets (e.g., cost, schedule, or performance metrics). If the contractor performs better than the target, the fee increases, up to a ceiling; if performance is worse, the fee decreases, down to a floor. This structure incentivizes the contractor to control costs and meet performance objectives to maximize their fee. Compared to a firm-fixed-price contract, where the contractor bears most of the cost risk and has a strong incentive for cost control from the outset, CPIF offers more flexibility but can potentially lead to higher final costs if targets are not well-defined or if the contractor prioritizes fee maximization over absolute cost minimization. For taxpayers, the outcome depends heavily on the realism of the targets and the effectiveness of government oversight in managing the incentive structure.

What is the historical spending pattern for 'Other Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing' by the Department of Defense?

Historical spending data for the 'Other Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing' (NAICS 336413) by the Department of Defense (DoD) reveals a consistent and substantial investment in this sector. While specific figures fluctuate annually based on operational tempo, modernization programs, and sustainment needs, the DoD is a major procurer of aircraft parts. Annual spending often runs into the billions of dollars across all branches. This particular contract, valued at over $451 million, represents a significant portion of spending within this category for the period it covers (2007-2010). Trends indicate a steady demand driven by the large existing fleet of military aircraft requiring maintenance, repair, and replacement parts, as well as upgrades to existing platforms. The reliance on specialized manufacturers like Textron Systems Corporation highlights the critical nature of this spending for maintaining airpower capabilities.

Given the sole-source nature, what mechanisms are in place to ensure Textron Systems Corporation is not engaging in price gouging?

Even in sole-source procurements, the government employs several mechanisms to mitigate the risk of price gouging and ensure fair and reasonable pricing. The contracting officer is responsible for obtaining certified cost or pricing data from the contractor, especially for contracts exceeding certain thresholds (which this $451M contract would certainly surpass). This data allows the government to analyze the contractor's cost structure, including direct costs, indirect costs, and profit. The government may also conduct should-cost analyses, which estimate what a contract should cost based on market research, historical data, and industry benchmarks. Furthermore, the contract type (Cost Plus Incentive Fee) includes performance targets, and the fee adjustment mechanism provides some leverage. Finally, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) often plays a role in auditing the contractor's cost proposals to verify the accuracy and allowability of claimed costs. These measures collectively aim to provide a basis for negotiation and ensure the price paid is fair and reasonable, despite the lack of direct competition.

What are the potential risks associated with a long-duration contract (1095 days) for aircraft parts, particularly under a sole-source arrangement?

A long-duration contract, such as this 1095-day (3-year) agreement, for aircraft parts, especially when sole-sourced, presents several potential risks. Firstly, market conditions and technology can change rapidly in the aerospace sector. A long-term commitment might lock the government into using parts or processes that become outdated or less efficient compared to emerging alternatives. Secondly, without ongoing competition, the incentive for the contractor to innovate or find cost-saving efficiencies may diminish over time. The Cost-Plus Incentive Fee structure helps mitigate this to some extent, but the baseline for targets is set early on. Thirdly, the government's negotiating position can weaken over the contract's life if Textron Systems Corporation becomes the sole, indispensable supplier for these critical parts. This could lead to price increases during potential option periods or future sole-source renewals if not carefully managed. Lastly, unforeseen supply chain disruptions or manufacturing issues faced by the sole supplier could have a prolonged impact on military readiness.

Industry Classification

NAICS: ManufacturingAerospace Product and Parts ManufacturingOther Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing

Product/Service Code: AEROSPACE CRAFT AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

Competition & Pricing

Extent Competed: NOT COMPETED

Solicitation Procedures: ONLY ONE SOURCE

Solicitation ID: W58RGZ07R0566

Offers Received: 1

Pricing Type: COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE (V)

Evaluated Preference: NONE

Contractor Details

Parent Company: Textron Inc

Address: 124 INDUSTRY LN, HUNT VALLEY, MD, 21030

Business Categories: Category Business, Not Designated a Small Business

Financial Breakdown

Contract Ceiling: $451,206,698

Exercised Options: $451,206,698

Current Obligation: $451,206,698

Contract Characteristics

Commercial Item: COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS/SERVICES PROCEDURES NOT USED

Cost or Pricing Data: YES

Timeline

Start Date: 2007-11-01

Current End Date: 2010-10-31

Potential End Date: 2010-10-31 12:10:00

Last Modified: 2024-10-18

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